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Abstract
The method of equivalent variational methods, originally due to Carathéodory for free
problems in the calculus of variations is extended to investigate feedback Nash equilibria
for a class of n-person differential games. Both the finite-horizon and infinite-horizon cases
are considered. Examples are given to illustrate the presented results.
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1. Introduction
The quest for sufficient conditions for minimizers in the calculus of variations
occupied much of the 19th century culminating with the now classical ideas of the
Weierstrass excess function, fields of extremals, and Hilbert’s invariant integral.
In the early part of the 20th century, Carathéodory presented an alternative view
of these ideas by introducing the notion of equivalent variational problems. These
ideas led to the modern development of dynamic programming and for the solu-
tion of the Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman equation. The work of Carathéodory, which
is nicely collected in his book [4], went largely unnoticed in the arena of optimal
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control except for the work of Bridgeland [3] and Snow [15] in the late 1960’s.
In the early 1980’s these results were generalized to nonsmooth variational prob-
lems (and therefore Lagrange-type optimal control problems) in Carlson [8]. Ad-
ditionally, this approach was modified for infinite horizon problems in Carlson [9]
where it was shown to unify and extend several approaches for these problems.
During the 1940’s the study of zero-sum differential games was initiated to
study pursuit-evasion maneuvers in combat aircraft. After these beginnings, this
theory has developed rapidly and much is known concerning the existence of a
feedback Nash equilibrium for these types of problems. It is not the intention of
this author to attempt to survey this voluminous literature. Suffice it to say that in
this situation a suitable Hamilton–Jacobi theory has been obtained in the works
of Berkovitz [2] and others. In this literature the Hamilton–Jacobi equation is
frequently referred to as the Isaac’s equation after R. Isaac, an early pioneer in this
area. To date, a similar theory has apparently not been as extensively developed
for nonzero-sum dynamic games. It is the intent of this current paper to contribute
to this development. Specifically we will generalize the ideas of Carathéodory’s
method of equivalent problems to be suitable for studying a class of p-player
games in both the finite and infinite horizon settings.
The plan of our paper is as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the basic notation
and terminology used throughout the paper. Section 3 will present our extension
of the results in [8] to the case of p-player dynamic games with finite horizon.
In Section 4 we will introduce the notion of an overtaking Nash equilibrium for
infinite horizon dynamic games and give our extension of Carathéodory’s method
to the infinite horizon case. The next section will give two simple examples in
which these results are applicable and we conclude our paper with some additional
remarks and conclusions.
2. The dynamic game
We consider a p-player dynamic game on the fixed time interval [0, T ]. The
state of the j th player is denoted by the vector-valued function xj (·) : [0, T ] →
R
nj and it is assumed that a feasible strategy satisfies the fixed end-point con-
ditions
xj (0)= xj0 and xj (T )= xjT (1)
for each j = 1,2, . . . , p, in which xj0, xjT ∈ Rnj are fixed constant vectors.
We let x = (x1, x2, . . . , xp) denote the aggregate vector in Rn = ∏pj=1Rnj
representing the entire state of the game. The dynamics of each player will be
described by an ordinary control system given, for j = 1,2, . . . , p, by
x˙j (t)= fj
(
t,x(t), uj (t)
)
, a.e. t ∈ [0, T ], (2)
uj (t) ∈Uj
(
t,x(t)
)
, a.e. t ∈ [0, T ], (3)
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x(t) ∈X, t ∈ [0, T ], (4)
in which the strategy of the j th player is given by the control function uj :
[0, T ] → Rmj , X ⊂ Rn is closed, Uj : [0, T ] × X → 2Rmj is a nonempty set-
valued mapping with closed graph Mj = {(t,x, uj ): t ∈ [0, T ], x ∈ X, and
uj ∈ Uj(t,x)}, and where fj :Mj → Rnj is a Carathéodory function (i.e., fj
is Lebesgue measurable in t for each fixed (x, uj ) and continuous in (x, uj ) for
almost all t ∈ [0, T ]). We observe that the coupling between the players takes
place explicitly through the states of the players and not the strategies.
We assume that the cost associated to each player is described by an integral
functional,
Jj (x, uj )=
T∫
0
f 0j
(
t,x(t), uj (t)
)
dt, (5)
in which f 0j :Mj → R is a Lebesgue normal integrand (i.e., f 0j is measurable
with respect to the σ -algebra generated by products of Lebesgue subsets of [0, T ]
with Borel measurable subsets of Rn ×Rmj ).
In addition to the assumptions listed above we require some convexity and
seminormality conditions. To define these conditions define the set-valued map-
pings Q˜j : [0, T ] ×X → 2R1+nj , for j = 1,2, . . . , p, by the formula
Q˜j (t,x)=
{(
z0, zj
)
: z0  f 0j (t,x, uj ), zj = fj (t,x, uj ), uj ∈ Uj(t,x)
}
.
(6)
With these set-valued mappings we make the following assumptions:
Assumption 2.1. For each (t,x) ∈ [0, T ] × X and j = 1,2, . . . , p we have
that Q˜j (t,x) is closed, nonempty, convex and enjoys the upper semicontinuity
property (K) with respect to x. That is, for almost all t ∈ [0, T ] and all x ∈ X we
have
Q˜j (t,x)=
⋂
δ>0
cl
[⋃{
Q˜j (t,y): y ∈ X, ‖x− y‖< δ
}]
, (7)
where for any set A we let cl[A] denote its closure.
Remark 2.1. The convexity and upper semicontinuity properties are standard
assumptions made in the theory of optimal control and correspond to the classical
seminormality and convexity conditions found in the works of Tonelli, McShane,
and others in the 1920’s and 1930’s. For detailed information regarding this and
other related matters the reader is referred to the monograph of Cesari [10]. To
better understand these conditions we define the extended real-valued functions
Lj : [0, T ] ×Rn ×Rnj →R∪ {+∞} by the formula
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Lj (t,x, zj )=
{
inf{z0: (z0, zj ) ∈ Q˜j (t,x)}, if (t,x) ∈ [0, T ] ×Rn,
+∞, otherwise. (8)
It is well known (see, e.g., Cesari [10]) that, under the above convexity and
semicontinuity conditions, the functions Lj are Lebesgue normal integrands
which additionally are such that Lj(t, · , ·) is lower semicontinuous for almost all
t ∈ [0, T ] and Lj(t,x, ·) is a convex function onRnj intoR∪{+∞}. Additionally
it is also well known that if {x(·),u(·)} is an admissible pair (see the definitions
below) for the above control systems given by (2)–(4) then we have
T∫
0
Lj
(
t,x(t), x˙j (t)
)
dt 
T∫
0
f 0j
(
t,x, uj (t)
)
dt
and moreover there exists a strategy v : [0, T ] → Rm such that {x(·),v(·)} is ad-
missible and that
T∫
0
Lj
(
t,x(t), x˙j (t)
)
dt =
T∫
0
f 0j
(
t,x(t), vj (t)
)
dt.
Conversely, if x : [0, T ] → Rn is such that t → Lj (t,x(t), x˙j (t)) is finite a.e. on
[0, T ] and integrable then there exists a measurable strategy v : [0, T ]→Rm such
that {x(·),v(·)} is an admissible pair and such that
L
(
t,x(t), x˙j (t)
)= f 0j (t,x(t), vj (t)), a.e. 0 t  T .
As a consequence of these facts it is possible to view our problem in an abstract
calculus of variations framework. This will permit us to compare our results with
comparable results expressed in a variational setting.
In addition to the above hypotheses we require the following growth condi-
tions.
Assumption 2.2. For each j = 1,2, . . . , p and  > 0 there exists integrable
functions ψj : [0, T ]→R such that∥∥fj (t,x, uj )∥∥ψj(t)+ f 0j (t,x, uj ) (9)
holds a.e. in t ∈ [0, T ] for (t,x, uj ) ∈Mj .
This growth condition is a standard one that was introduced in the work of
Cesari and others. Further it is known to be equivalent to several other growth
hypotheses found in the literature. Once again we refer the interested reader to
Cesari [10] for further information.
The performance of each player is measured through its preference crite-
rion (5). However, as a result of the dependence of the performance integrand as
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well as the dynamics of one player on the others it is impossible for each player to
minimize his performance as he would like. The best that any player can do is give
his/her best reply to the strategies of his/her opponents. That is, the players strive
for some sort of equilibrium. In the situation here we will consider two types of
Nash equilibrium, open-loop and (state) feedback equilibrium. These notions are
most easily understood once we introduce one more piece of notation. For x ∈Rn
and yj ∈Rnj , the symbol [xj , yj ] denotes a new element in Rn described by[
xj , yj
]= (x1, x2, . . . , xj−1, yj , xj+1, . . . , xp).
Similarly for u ∈Rm and vj ∈Rmj we let[
uj , vj
]= (u1, u2, . . . , uj−1, vj , uj+1, . . . , up).
With this notation we have the following definitions:
Definition 2.1. A function u = (u1, u2, . . . , up) : [0, T ] → Rm is an admissible
open-loop strategy for the dynamic game if it is Lebesgue measurable and if there
exists an absolutely continuous function x : [0, T ] → Rn such that the control
system (2)–(4) is satisfied by the pair {x,u} and if it satisfies the boundary
conditions given by Eq. (1).
Remark 2.2. Following standard conventions we refer to the function x(·) as an
admissible state associated with the admissible strategy u(·).
Definition 2.2. An admissible open-loop strategy u∗ : [0, T ] → Rm is called an
open-loop Nash equilibrium if for each j = 1,2, . . . , p and function vj : [0, T ]→
R
mj having the property that [u∗j , vj ] : [0, T ] → Rm is an admissible strategy
with associated admissible state y : [0, T ]→Rn we have
T∫
0
f 0j
(
t,x∗(t), u∗j (t)
)
dt 
T∫
0
f 0j
(
t,y(t), vj (t)
)
dt.
Remark 2.3. The constraint given by Eq. (3) may be described as a feedback
type strategy constraint since the set-valued mappings Uj (· , ·) depend on the ad-
missible states. It does not preclude the possibility that these set-valued mappings
depend only on time. Thus we are not a priori searching for Nash feedback strate-
gies.
To describe the notion of a feedback Nash equilibrium we let B denote a
set of functions q = (q1, q2, . . . , qp) : [0, T ] × Rn → Rm that are at least of
Carathéodory type (i.e., each component is continuous in x and is Lebesgue
measurable in t). Depending on the problem structure it might be advantageous to
restrictB to consist of more regular functions. For example, in a linear–quadratic
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regulator game this set might consist only of mappings that are linear in the states.
With this notation we have the following definitions.
Definition 2.3. A function u = (u1, u2, . . . , up) : [0, T ] → Rm is an admissible
feedback strategy (relative to B) for the dynamic game if it is Lebesgue measur-
able, if there is a corresponding absolutely continuous function x : [0, T ] → Rn
satisfying the end conditions (1), the pair {x,u} satisfies the control system given
by (2)–(4), and if there exists a function q ∈B such that
u(t)= q(t,x(t)), a.e. 0 t  T , (10)
for j = 1,2, . . . , p, in which xj (·)= (x1(·), x2(·), . . . , xp(·)).
Definition 2.4. An admissible feedback strategy for the dynamic game u∗ : [0, T ]
→ Rm is called a feedback Nash equilibrium if for each j = 1,2, . . . , p and
function vj : [0, T ] → Rmj having the property that [u∗j , vj ] : [0, T ] → Rm is
an admissible feedback strategy for the dynamic game we have
T∫
0
f 0j
(
t,x∗(t), x∗j (t)
)
dt 
T∫
0
f 0j
(
t,
[
x∗j , yj
]
(t), vj (t)
)
dt,
in which [x∗j , yj ] : [0, T ] → Rn is an admissible state associated with the feed-
back strategy [u∗j , vj ](·).
Remark 2.4. The definition of feedback strategy clearly depends on the choice
of the setB and it will be assumed throughout that when feedback strategies and
equilibria are discussed that the setB has been chosen a priori.
3. Carathéodory’s method for dynamic games
In this section we begin by briefly summarizing Carathéodory’s method. To
get to the heart of the matter we consider the variational format, with L1(· , · , ·)
defined as in Eq. (8). We assume that the general hypotheses described above hold
for the case when j = 1. To begin, Carathéodory made the following observation.
For any sufficiently smooth function S : [0, T ] × Rn1 → R we define a new
integrand L1 : [0, T ] ×Rn1 →R by the formula
L1(t, x, z)= L1(t, x, z)− ∂S(t, x)
∂t
−
〈
∂S(t, x)
∂x
, z
〉
.
The value along any admissible trajectory, x : [0, T ]→Rn1 , of the functional
J1(x)=
T∫
0
L1
(
t, x(t), x˙(t)
)
dt
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satisfies
J1(x)=
T∫
0
L1
(
t, x(t), x˙(t)
)− ∂S(t, x(t))
∂t
−
〈
∂S(t, x(t))
∂x
, x˙(t)
〉
dt
=
T∫
0
L1
(
t, x(t), x˙(t)
)
dt − [S(T ,x(T ))− S(0, x(0))].
From this it immediately follows that if the endpoints of the admissible trajec-
tories are fixed, then the value of this new objective functional differs only from
the original objective functional by a fixed constant that depends only on S(· , ·)
and the endpoint data (T , xT ) and (0, x0). That is we have,
J1(x)− J1(x)= S(T , xT )− S(0, x0).
Clearly this implies that the minimizers of J1(·) and those of J1(·) coincide. For
this reason, Carathéodory referred to the two variational problems, that of mini-
mizing J1(·) and that of minimizing J1(·) over the set of admissible trajectories
satisfying the same end conditions, as equivalent variational problems. This sim-
ple observation is not useful unless one judiciously chooses the function S(· , ·). If
one follows Carathéodory’s development further he demonstrates that an appro-
priate function S(· , ·) may be obtained by solving the Hamilton–Jacobi equation
∂S
∂t
+H1
(
t, x,
∂S
∂x1
)
= 0,
in which the Hamiltonian H1 : [0, T ] ×Rn ×Rn →R∪−∞ is given by
H1(t, x,p)= sup
z∈Rn
{〈p, z〉 −L1(t, x, z)}.
He further demonstrates that a feedback solution can be obtained by defining the
“slope function” p1 : [0, T ]→Rn1 through the relationship
∂S
∂x1
= ∂L1(t, x,p1(t, x))
∂z1
.
An optimal solution is then obtained by solving the two-point boundary value
problem
x˙1(t)= p1
(
t, x1(t)
)
, a.e. 0 t  T ,
x1(0)= x0 and x1(T )= xT .
It is this insight that makes Carathéodory’s method both useful and attractive.
Remark 3.1. To recast the conclusions of Carathéodory’s method in the frame-
work considered here (i.e., the control formulation) it can be shown (see, e.g.,
Carlson [8] or Cesari [10]), under the hypotheses outlined previously, that since
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L1(t, x,p1(t, x)) < +∞ there is a measurable function q1 : [0, T ] × Rm1 such
that
q1(t, x) ∈U1(t, x),
L1
(
t, x,p(t, x)
)= f 01 (t, x, q1(t, x)),
and
p1(t, x)= f1
(
t, x, q1(t, x)
)
hold for almost all t ∈ [0, T ] and x ∈Rn1 . This allows us to write the above two-
point boundary value problem as
x˙1(t)= f1
(
t, x1(t), q1
(
t, x(t)
))
, a.e. 0 t  T ,
x1(0)= x0 and x1(T )= xT .
Thus we have that q1(· , ·) represents an optimal feedback control.
From the above discussion, the underpinnings of Carathéodory’s method in the
calculus of variations rests in defining a family of equivalent variational problems
that are obtained by perturbing the integrand in the objective functional by a total
derivative. The equivalence, as we saw above, follows easily as a result of the fixed
end conditions and the fundamental theorem of calculus. To carry these ideas over
to the dynamic game setting we let Sj : [0, T ] ×Rn →R for j = 1,2, . . . , p be a
set of differentiable functions and define the new integrandsFj : [0, T ]×Rn×Rm
by the formulas
Fj (t,x,u) .= f 0j (t,x, uj )−
∂Sj (t,x)
∂t
−
p∑
i=1
〈
∂Sj (t,x)
∂xi
, fi(t,x, ui)
〉
for j = 1,2, . . . , p. We now observe that if {x,u} is an admissible state-strategy
pair for the dynamic game (in either the open-loop or feedback case) we have the
following:
T∫
0
Fj
(
t,x(t),u(t)
)
dt =
T∫
0
f 0j
(
t,x(t), uj (t)
)− ∂Sj (t,x(t))
∂t
(11)
−
p∑
i=1
〈
∂Sj (t,x(t))
∂xi
, fi
(
t,x(t), ui(t)
)〉
dt (12)
=
T∫
0
f 0j
(
t,x(t), uj (t)
)
dt − dS
j (t,x(t))
dt
(13)
=
T∫
0
f 0j
(
t,x(t), uj (t)
)
dt (14)
− (Sj (T ,xT )− Sj (0,x0)). (15)
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From this simple computation we see that we can define a new dynamic game
with costs described by the integrands Fj (· , · , ·) over the same set of admissible
strategies having the property that the value of each payoff along an admissible
strategy for the new game differs from the value of each payoff for the original
game by an additive constant that depends only on the choice of functions Sj (· , ·)
and the fixed end conditions. Following Carathéodory’s lead we call these two
dynamic games equivalent. One immediate observation to notice is that the new
game defined in this way is more complicated than the original game since the
new integrand for the j th player now depends on the derivatives of all of the
players and not only on its own derivative. This could perhaps limit the utility of
these results.
While the above is a nice observation, the existence of functions Sj (· , ·) are
of little value unless they are carefully chosen. Thus we will seek functions for
which the new integrands, Fj (· , · , ·), are such that the following conditions hold:
Assumption 3.1. There exists differentiable functions Sj (· , ·) : [0, T ] × X →
R and functions qj (· , ·) : [0, T ] × X → Rmj for j = 1,2, . . . , p which are
measurable in t and Lipschitzian in x such that for j = 1,2, . . . , p we have
(t,x, qj (t,x)) ∈Mj for almost all t ∈ [0, T ], (t,x) ∈ [0, T ] ×X, and
(A1) For each j = 1,2, . . . , p and all (t,x, uj ) ∈Mj we have
0 f 0j (t,x, uj )−
∂Sj (t,x)
∂t
−
∑
i =j
〈
∂Sj (t,x)
∂xi
, fi
(
t,x, qi(t,x)
)〉
−
〈
∂Sj (t,x)
∂xj
, fj (t,x, uj )
〉
. (16)
(A2) For each j = 1,2, . . . , p and all (t,x) ∈ [0, T ] ×Rn,
0= f 0j
(
t,x, qj (t,x)
)− ∂Sj (t,x)
∂t
−
p∑
i=1
〈
∂Sj (t,x)
∂xi
, fi
(
t,x, qi(t,x)
)〉
, (17)
for all (t,x) ∈ [0, T ] ×Rn.
Remark 3.2. We note that we have selected Sj (· , ·) and qj (· , ·) such that the
function q(t,x)= (q1(t,x), . . . , qp(t,x)) is a Nash equilibrium of the static game
with costs Fj (t,x, uj ). Further we note that at the equilibrium the value of the
costs of each player is identically zero.
The utility of such a selection is seen in the following result.
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Theorem 3.1. Suppose that Sj (· , ·) and qj (· , ·) are such that Assumption 3.1 (and
particularly the conditions (16) and (17)) is satisfied. Then any solution, denoted
by x∗(·), of the two-point boundary value problem
x˙j (t)= fj
(
t,x(t), qj
(
t,x(t)
))
, (18)
xj (0)= xj0 and xj (T )= xjT , (19)
for j = 1,2, . . . , p, is an admissible open-loop state associated with the admis-
sible open-loop strategy defined for each t ∈ [0, T ] by u∗(t)= q(t,x∗(t)). More-
over, this open-loop strategy is an open-loop Nash equilibrium.
Proof. Let x∗(·) solve the two-point boundary value problem (18), (19) and put
u∗(t)= q(t,x∗(t)) for t ∈ [0, T ]. For fixed j = 1,2, . . . , p let vj : [0, T ] → Rmj
be a measurable function such that [u∗j , vj ](·) is an admissible open-loop strategy
generating the admissible state y(·). Then, using assumptions (16) and (17) and
the fundamental theorem of calculus we have
T∫
0
f 0j
(
t,y(t), vj (t)
)
dt 
T∫
0
d
dt
Sj
(
t,y(t)
)
dt
= S(T ,xT )− S(0,x0)=
T∫
0
d
dt
Sj
(
t,x∗(t)
)
dt
=
T∫
0
f 0j
(
t,x∗(t), u∗j (t)
)
dt
giving us the desired conclusion since j and vj (·) were chosen arbitrarily. ✷
Postulating the existence of such functions and providing conditions under
which one can reasonably find them are naturally two different things. The next
theorem demonstrates one approach to resolving this problem. Before stating
this theorem we observe that the above formulation gives an open-loop Nash
equilibrium in a feedback form. This is because it is not known a priori whether
the map q(· , ·) is an element of the class of admissible feedbacks, B. Therefore
we cannot conclude that it is an admissible feedback Nash equilibrium. On the
other hand, if one can a priori determine that q(· , ·) as described above belongs to
B, the set of admissible feedbacks, then we obtain a feedback Nash equilibrium.
Consequently, if we seek feedback solutions out of the largest possible set of
admissible feedbacks the function q(· , ·) will indeed generate a feedback Nash
equilibrium. To present this result we need one more notational device. For a
vector z = (z1, z2, . . . , zp) ∈ Rn we use the notation z−j to denote the vector in
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R
n−nj obtained by omitting the nj coordinates corresponding to zj . That is, we
have
z−j = (z1, z2, . . . , zj−1, zj+1, . . . , zp).
With this notation we can now state the following theorem.
Theorem 3.2. For j = 1,2, . . . , p let (f 0j , fj ) :Mj →R1+nj be continuous with
continuous first partial derivatives with respect to uj and define the Hamiltonians
Hj : [0, T ] ×X×Rnj →R by
Hj(t,x,pj )= sup
{〈
pj ,fj (t,x, u)
〉− f 0j (t,x, u): u ∈Uj(t,x)}. (20)
Further, for j = 1,2, . . . , p let Sj : [0, T ] × X → R and qj : [0, T ] × X → Rmj
be given functions with Sj continuously differentiable in all of its variables, qj
continuous on their domains and such that (t,x, qj (t,x)) ∈Mj . Finally assume
that the following relations hold for all (t,x) ∈ [0, T ] ×X and j = 1,2, . . . , p:
∂f 0j (t,x, qj (t,x))
∂uj
=
(
∂fj (t,x, qj (t,x))
∂uj
)′
∂Sj (t,x)
∂xj
, (21)
0= ∂S
j (t,x)
∂t
+Hj
(
t,x,
∂Sj (t,x)
∂xj
)
+
〈
∂Sj (t,x)
∂x−j
,q−j (t,x)
〉
. (22)
Then any solution, denoted by x∗(·), of the two-point boundary value problem
x˙j (t)= fj
(
t,x(t), qj
(
t,x(t)
))
,
xj (0)= xj0 and xj (T )= xjT ,
for j = 1,2, . . . , p, is an admissible open-loop state associated with the admis-
sible open-loop strategy defined for each t ∈ [0, T ] by u∗(t)= q(t,x∗(t)). More-
over, this open-loop strategy is an open-loop Nash equilibrium.
Remark 3.3. For any m× n matrix A the notation A′ denotes its transpose.
Remark 3.4. A comparison of the discussion in Remark 3.1 and the conclusion of
the above theorem clearly show that the above approach extends Carathéodory’s
method to dynamics games.
Proof of Theorem 3.2. We observe that the conditions given by (16) and (17)
insure that for each j = 1,2, . . . , p and (t,x) ∈ [0, T ] ×X the function qj (t,x) is
a minimizer of the map
uj → f 0j (t,x, uj )−
∂Sj (t,x)
∂t
−
∑
i =j
〈
∂Sj (t,x)
∂xi
, fi
(
t,x, qi(t,x)
)〉− 〈∂Sj (t,x)
∂xj
, fj (t,x, uj )
〉
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and that this form has a zero minimum value. The condition given by (21) when
combined with the convexity and seminormality hypotheses insure that
Hj
(
t,x,
∂Sj (t,x)
∂xj
)
=
〈
∂Sj (t,x)
∂xj
, fj
(
t,x, qj (t,x)
)〉− f 0j (t,x, qj (t,x))
for (t,x) ∈ [0, T ] ×X. Clearly this is equivalent to the condition that (16) holds.
The remaining condition (22) simply insures that the condition (17) holds. The
desired conclusion now follows directly from Theorem 3.1. ✷
In the above theorem we notice that the partial differential equations given
in Eq. (22) constitute a set of Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman equations and naturally
reduce to the well known Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman equation found in optimal
control theory, or more classically the calculus of variations. Similarly, Eq. (21)
provides conditions under which the “feedbacks” can be obtained. These of course
are a family of Legendre-type transformations which are analogues of the classical
Legendre transformation found in the calculus of variations.
Remark 3.5. The formulation above can be easily modified to show that the
feedback equilibria obtained in the above theory are subgame perfect. In particular
we require the following modifications to Definitions 2.3 and 2.4, respectively:
Definition 3.1. Let τ ∈ [0, T ] and xˆ ∈X be fixed. A function u = (u1, u2, . . . , up) :
[τ, T ] → Rm is an admissible feedback strategy (relative to B) for the dynamic
game on [τ, T ] if it is Lebesgue measurable, if there is a corresponding absolutely
continuous function x : [τ, T ] → Rn such that the pair {x,u} satisfies the control
system given by (2)–(4) on [τ, T ] as well as the end conditions
x(τ )= xˆ and x(T )= xT ,
and if there exists a function q ∈B such that
u(t)= q(t,x(t)), a.e. τ  t  T , (23)
for j = 1,2, . . . , p, in which xj (·)= (x1(·), x2(·), . . . , xp(·)).
Definition 3.2. An admissible feedback strategy for the dynamic game, u∗ : [0, T ]
→ Rm is called a feedback Nash equilibrium if for each τ ∈ [0, T ], for
each j = 1,2, . . . , p and function vj : [0, T ] → Rmj having the property that
[u∗j , vj ] : [0, T ]→ Rm is an admissible feedback strategy for the dynamic game
on [τ, T ] we have
T∫
τ
f 0j
(
t,x∗(t), u∗j (t)
)
dt 
T∫
τ
f 0j
(
t,
[
x∗j , yj
]
(t), vj (t)
)
dt,
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in which [x∗j , yj ] : [0, T ] → Rn is an admissible state associated with the feed-
back strategy [u∗j , vj ](·) satisfying the initial condition[
x∗j , yj
]
(τ )= x∗(τ ).
With these minor modifications it is now easy to see that the above theory
carries over directly this case with obvious modifications. We leave these technical
details to the interested reader.
We conclude this section by indicating the relationship between the above
approach and that of dynamic programming. We recall in dynamic programming
that the value functions V j (· , ·) : [0, T ] ×X →R, defined by
V j (τ,x)= inf
{ T∫
τ
f 0j
(
t,x(t), uj (t)
)
dt
}
,
in which the the infimum is taken over all measurable strategies uj : [τ, T ] →
R
mj for which [q(· ,x(·))j , uj ](·) is an admissible strategy that generates an
admissible state x(·) : [τ, T ] → Rn satisfying the initial condition x(τ ) = x, are
obtained by backwards integration. Further, it is known that under appropriate
smoothness hypotheses these functions satisfy a Hamilton–Jacobi equation. If
we suppose that the solutions Sj (· , ·) of the Hamilton–Jacobi system further
enjoy the boundary condition Sj (T ,x)= 0 we see immediately from our previous
discussion that
T∫
τ
f 0j
(
t,x∗(t), qj
(
t,x∗(t)
))
dt =−Sj (τ,x),
whenever x∗(·) : [τ, T ]→Rn satisfies the two-point boundary value problem
x˙∗j (t)= fj
(
t,x∗(t), qj
(
t,x∗(t)
))
, for j = 1,2, . . . , p,
x∗(τ )= x and x∗(T )= xT
giving us immediately that Sj (τ,x)=−V j (τ,x).
3.1. A comparison to other results
We now discuss the relationship of our results to earlier results. The theory
presented above provides a set of sufficient conditions for Nash equilibria. In
the framework of optimal control theory these ideas are often termed verification
theorems. These ideas have been pursued in the dynamic game arena as well
and it is here that our results are best compared. The use of a Hamilton–
Jacobi–Bellman or Isaacs equation has a rich history in two-person zero-sum
games beginning with the pioneering work of Isaac and continued to the present
by a number of researchers. In particular we direct the reader to the work of
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Berkovitz [2] for a somewhat recent survey. For the case of non-zero dynamic
games the ideas presented above have also been studied beginning at least as
early as 1969 in the paper of Starr and Ho [16] in which necessary conditions for
Nash equilibria are obtained. Additional early results appear in Friedman [12].
In Bas¸ar and Olsder [1] there is an interesting discussion of the Hamilton–
Jacobi–Bellman theory for feedback Nash equilibria in the context of stochastic
differential games. If one compares the results obtained above in Theorem 3.2
with those of Theorem B-1 in [1] we see that our system of Hamilton–Jacobi
equations coincides with the system given there (of course, after we remove the
stochasticism and consider the class of dynamic games considered here). As a
result of the stochastic terms in the model considered in [1] their Hamilton–
Jacobi equations become a system of second-order semilinear partial differential
equations while in our case we obtain a system of first-order partial differential
equations. As indicated in [1] results regarding the existence of sufficiently
smooth solutions to this system has been investigated in Uchida [18] and [19].
These results involve the so called Nash condition which is closely related to the
conditions we assume in (16) and (17). It would be of interest to investigate how
these ideas could be used in the case considered here.
More recent results in the literature that provide conditions for the existence
of a Nash equilibrium involve for the most part stochastic games. In particular
we mention the work on correlated Nash equilibrium found in Nowak [13] for
deterministic nonzero sum dynamic games and in Nowak and Szajowski [14]
in the stochastic case. Their work is not a verification theory but is rather a
result concerning the existence of an equilibrium. Consequently, their results are
not directly comparable to those presented here. Additionally, their results are
obtained via the use of relaxed or chattering controls while ours assumes sufficient
convexity conditions to avoid the introduction of relaxed controls. Another result
that concerns the existence of Nash equilibrium is found in Courtat [11] in
which the existence of a Markov–Nash equilibria is found for a class of discrete
time stochastic games. Here, once again, the results presented in [11] are not
comparable to ours since it is not in the same spirit as the results presented here.
Rather, his results are more comparable to those of Nowak and Szajowski [14].
4. The extension to infinite horizon dynamic games
In this section we extend the results of the previous section to the case when
the finite time interval [0, T ] is replaced by the unbounded time interval [0,+∞).
It is for this case that the results established in this paper are particularly relevant.
Indeed, the lack of an a priori assumption on the convergence of the improper
integrals below renders the dynamic programming approach inapplicable since
the appropriate value functions are not necessarily defined. For the infinite horizon
case, the costs are now briefly described as improper integrals of the form
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Jj (x, uj )=
+∞∫
0
f 0j
(
t,x(t), uj (t)
)
dt for j = 1,2, . . . , p. (24)
In this setting it is reasonable to assume that the terminal condition no longer
holds. In addition, there is no reason to assume that the improper integrals defined
by (24) converge. As a consequence of this divergence we must consider a weaker
concept of equilibrium known as an overtaking Nash equilibrium. This notion is
the direct analog of the corresponding concept of an overtaking optimality found
in the theory of infinite horizon optimal control (see, e.g., Carlson et al. [5]). Thus
we have the following definitions.
Definition 4.1. A function u = (u1, u2, . . . , up) : [0,+∞)→Rm is an admissible
open-loop strategy for the infinite horizon dynamic game if it is Lebesgue
measurable and if there exists a function x : [0,+∞)→ Rn which is absolutely
continuous on each bounded interval [0, T ], T > 0, and such that the control
system (2)–(4) is satisfied by the pair {x,u} with the fixed initial condition
x(0)= x0. (25)
Definition 4.2. An admissible strategy for the open-loop infinite horizon dynamic
game, u∗(·), is called
(1) a strong open-loop Nash equilibrium if for each j = 1,2, . . . , p it happens
that
Jj
(
x∗, u∗j
)=
+∞∫
0
f 0j
(
t,x∗(t), u∗j (t)
)
dt <+∞
and if for each j and any function v : [0,+∞)→Rmj for which the function
[u∗j , v](·) is an admissible open-loop strategy for the infinite horizon dy-
namic game we have
Jj
(
x∗, u∗j
)
 lim inf
T→∞
T∫
0
f 0j
(
t,y(t), v(t)
)
dt, (26)
in which y : [0, T ]→Rn is an admissible state associated with the admissible
open-loop strategy [u∗j , v](·);
(2) an overtaking open-loop Nash equilibrium if for each  > 0, j = 1,2, . . . , p,
and function v : [0,+∞) → Rmj for which the function [u∗j , v](·) is an
admissible open-loop strategy for infinite horizon dynamic game there exists
a Tˆ > 0 such that for all T > Tˆ we have
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T∫
0
f 0j
(
t,x∗(t), u∗j (t)
)
dt <
T∫
0
f 0j
(
t,y(t), v(t)
)
dt + , (27)
in which y : [0, T ]→Rn is an admissible state associated with the admissible
open-loop strategy [u∗j , v](·).
Similarly for the feedback case we have the following modifications. We let
B denote a set of functions q = (q1, q2, . . . , qp) : [0,+∞)× X → Rn that are at
least of Carathéodory type and give the following definitions.
Definition 4.3. A function u= (u1, u2, . . . , up) : [0,+∞)→Rm is an admissible
feedback strategy for the infinite horizon dynamic game if it is Lebesgue measur-
able, if there is a corresponding absolutely continuous function x : [0, T ] → Rn
satisfying the initial condition (25), the pair {x,u} satisfies the control system
given by (2)–(4), and if there exists a function q ∈B such that
u(t)= q(t,x(t)), a.e. 0 t  T , (28)
for j = 1,2, . . . , p, in which x(·)= (x1(·), x2(·), . . . , xp(·)).
Definition 4.4. An admissible strategy for the infinite horizon dynamic game x∗(·)
is called
(1) a strong feedback Nash equilibrium if for each j = 1,2, . . . , p it happens that
Jj
(
x∗, u∗j
)=
+∞∫
0
f 0j
(
t,x∗(t), u∗j (t)
)
dt <+∞
and if for each j and any function v : [0,+∞)→Rnj for which the function
[u∗j , v](·) is an admissible feedback strategy for the infinite horizon dynamic
game we have
Jj
(
x∗, u∗j
)
 lim inf
T→∞
T∫
0
f 0j
(
t,y(t), v(t)
)
dt, (29)
in which y : [0, T ]→Rn is an admissible state associated with the admissible
feedback strategy [u∗j , v](·);
(2) an overtaking feedback Nash equilibrium if for each  > 0, j = 1,2, . . . , p,
and function v : [0,+∞) → Rnj for which the function [u∗j , v](·) is an
admissible feedback strategy for the infinite horizon dynamic game there
exists a Tˆ > 0 such that for all T > Tˆ we have
T∫
0
f 0j
(
t,x∗(t), u∗j (t)
)
dt <
T∫
0
f 0j
(
t,y(t), v(t)
)
dt + , (30)
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in which y : [0, T ]→Rn is an admissible state associated with the admissible
feedback strategy [u∗j , v](·).
For Carathéodory’s method, as extended to the case of dynamic games in
the previous section, it is crucial that the admissible strategies satisfy a fixed
initial and fixed terminal constraint, unless S(T , x) ≡ 0. For the infinite horizon
case considered in this section this is no longer the case. As a consequence we
must proceed more carefully and define explicitly what we mean by equivalent
variational infinite horizon dynamic games. In particular, we must replace the
fixed terminal conditions by another property. As we shall see this condition is a
generalization of the “turnpike property” found in the literature of infinite horizon
optimal control theory (see [5]). We must also point out that in the area of infinite
horizon dynamic games Carlson and Haurie [6,7] have successfully extended the
turnpike theory to autonomous infinite horizon open-loop dynamic games. With
these brief remarks we have the following definition.
Definition 4.5. Suppose for j = 1,2, . . . , p the functions f 0j :Mj → R and
fj :Mj →Rnj , in which
Mj =
{
(t,x, uj ): t  0, x ∈X, uj ∈ Uj(t,x)
}
,
satisfy the conditions given in Section 2 on each interval [0, T ] for each T > 0 and
assume that for j = 1,2, . . . , p the functions Sj : [0,+∞)→R are differentiable.
Further, define the sets
M˜j =
{
(t,x,u): (t,x, uj ) ∈Mj , for j = 1,2, . . . , p
}
,
and define the new integrands Fj :M˜j →R by the formulas
Fj (t,x,u) .= f 0j (t,x, uj )−
∂Sj (t,x)
∂t
−
p∑
i=1
〈
∂Sj (t,x)
∂xi
, fj (t,x, uj )
〉
.
Now consider the new dynamic game over the same set of admissible strategies
with the new costs, up to time T > 0,
J Tj (x,u)=
T∫
0
Fj
(
t,x(t),u(t)
)
dt. (31)
We say the two infinite horizon dynamic games are equivalent if
(1) For every admissible state for the infinite horizon dynamic game we have
lim inf
t→+∞ S
j
(
t,x(t)
)
<+∞
for each j = 1,2, . . . , p.
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(2) For every pair of admissible state-strategy pairs,1 say {x(·),u(·)} and
{y(·),v(·)}, and each j = 1,2, . . . , p for which it happens that
lim
T→+∞J
T
j (x,u) <+∞, (32a)
lim
T→+∞J
T
j (y,v) <+∞ (32b)
both hold we have
lim
t→+∞S
j
(
t,x(t)
)− Sj (t,y(t))= 0. (33)
(3) For each j = 1,2, . . . , p we have
Fj (t,x,u) 0 for all (t,x,u) ∈ M˜j . (34)
Remark 4.1. The above definition is analogous to a similar notion described in
Carlson [9] for infinite horizon optimal control problems. The condition given in
Eq. (33) is a slight weakening of the result original proposed in Carlson [9] and
first appears in the work of Tan and Rugh [17]. This condition is a “turnpike”
assumption which says that certain exceptional strategies are attracted to each
other at infinity. We notice that here we have introduced a new class of dynamic
games which are more complicated than the original game. Nevertheless, as we
see in the next theorem, this definition provides us with the correct formulation to
extend the results of the previous section.
Theorem 4.1. Suppose that the functions (f 0j , fj ) :M˜j → R1+nj and the
functions Sj : [0,+∞)×Rn satisfy the conditions given in Definition 4.5. If
u∗ : [0,+∞)→ Rm is a strong open-loop (feedback) Nash equilibrium strategy
for the dynamic game with costs described by the integral functionals given in
Eq. (31), then it is an overtaking open-loop (feedback) Nash equilibrium strategy
for the original dynamic game.
Proof. We let u∗ : [0,+∞) → Rm be a strong open-loop (feedback) Nash
equilibrium for the dynamic game with the costs of each player, up to time T > 0,
described by the integral functionals given in (31). From this we know that u∗(·)
has the property that for j = 1,2, . . . , p limT→+∞J Tj (x∗,u∗) is finite (here x∗
denotes the admissible state associated with u∗). Now let v : [0,+∞)→ Rmj be
a measurable function such that [u∗j , v](·) is an admissible open-loop (feedback)
strategy for the infinite horizon dynamic game with admissible state y and con-
sider the following two cases:
1 Here we mean either admissible open-loop or feedback strategies.
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Case 1. We assume that
lim
T→+∞J
T
j
(
y,
[
u∗j , v
])
<+∞.
In this case we have
lim
t→+∞S
j
(
t,x∗(t)
)− Sj (t,y(t))= 0.
Therefore, for any T > 0 we have
J Tj
(
y,
[
u∗j , v
])−J Tj (x∗,u∗)
=
T∫
0
f 0j
(
t,y(t), v(t)
)
dt −
T∫
0
f 0j
(
t,x∗(t), u∗j (t)
)+ ∂Sj (t,x∗(t))
∂t
dt
+
T∫
0
p∑
i=1
〈
∂Sj (t,x∗(t))
∂xi
, fi
(
t,x∗(t), ui(t)
)〉
dt
−
T∫
0
∂Sj (t,y(t))
∂t
+
∑
i =j
〈
∂Sj (t,y(t))
∂xi
, fi
(
t,y(t), u∗i (t)
)〉
−
〈
∂Sj (t,y(t))
∂xj
, fj
(
t,y(t), v(t)
)〉
dt
=
T∫
0
f 0j
(
t,y(t), v(t)
)
dt −
T∫
0
f 0j
(
t,x∗(t), u∗j (t)
)
dt
+ [Sj (T ,x∗(T ))− Sj (0,x0)]− [Sj (T ,y(T ))− Sj (0,x0)]
=
T∫
0
f 0j
(
t,y(t), v(t)
)
dt −
T∫
0
f 0j
(
t,x∗(t), u∗j (t)
)
dt
+ [Sj (T ,x∗(T ))− Sj (T ,y(T ))].
Now, since u∗ is a strong Nash equilibrium we have
0 lim inf
T→+∞
[J Tj (y, [u∗j , v])−J Tj (x∗,u∗)].
This, when combined with the fact that limT→+∞J Tj (x∗[u∗j , v]) is finite,
permits us to assert that for each  > 0 there exists Tˆ > 0 such that both
J Tj
(
x∗,
[
u∗j , v
])−J Tj (x∗,u∗) >−2
and
Sj
(
T ,x∗(T )
)− Sj (T ,y(T ))< 
2
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hold for T > Tˆ . Combining these two results gives us
T∫
0
f 0j
(
t,x∗(t), u∗j (t)
)
dt <
T∫
0
f 0j
(
t,
[
y(t), v(t)
])
dt + ,
for all T > Tˆ . This immediately implies that u∗(·) “overtakes” [u∗j , v](·).
Case 2. We assume that
lim
T→+∞J
T
j
(
y,
[
u∗j , v
])=+∞.
In this case we have that
T∫
0
f 0j
(
t,y(t), v(t)
)
dt −
T∫
0
Lj
(
t,x∗(t), u∗j (t)
)
dt
= [J Tj (y, [u∗j , v])+ Sj (T ,y(T ))]− [J Tj (x∗,u∗)+ Sj (T ,x∗(T ))].
The first term on the right-hand side of the above expression approaches +∞ as
T →+∞ while the second term remains bounded as T →+∞. Therefore, we
necessarily have
lim inf
T→+∞
T∫
0
f 0j
(
t,
[
yj (t), v(t)
])
dt −
T∫
0
f 0j
(
t,x∗(t), u∗j (t)
)
dt =+∞,
which of course implies that u∗(·) “overtakes” [u∗j , v](·).
Combining the two cases we see that for each j = 1,2, . . . , p and each  > 0
there exists Tˆ > 0 such that for all T > Tˆ we have either Eq. (27) holds in the
open-loop case or that Eq. (30) holds in the feedback case. ✷
Perhaps the most difficult condition to verify in Definition 4.5 is the turnpike
condition given in Eq. (33). Our next result provides us conditions which will help
in establishing this condition.
Theorem 4.2. Suppose that the functions (f 0j , fj ) :M˜j →R1+nj satisfy the
hypotheses given in Section 2, and for j = 1,2, . . . , p let Sj : [0,+∞)×Rn →R
be differentiable functions such that conditions (1) and (3) of Definition 4.5 hold.
Further, suppose that for j = 1,2, . . . , p we have the following two additional
conditions holding:
(i) Either
lim sup
t→+∞
d
dt
Sj
(
t,x(t)
)
<+∞ (35)
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or
lim inf
t→+∞
d
dt
Sj
(
t,x(t)
)
>−∞ (36)
holds for every admissible state x : [0,+∞)→Rn.
(ii) For every  > 0 and admissible strategy u : [0,+∞) → Rm, there exists
δ = δ(u, ) > 0 such that |Sj (t,x(t))|>  implies
Fj
(
t,x(t),u(t)
)
> δ,
where F(· , · , ·) is as defined previously in Definition 4.5.
Then if u : [0,+∞)→Rx, x(0)= x0, is any admissible strategy for which
+∞∫
0
Fj
(
t,x(t),u(t)
)
dt <+∞,
it happens that
lim
t→+∞S
j
(
t,x(t)
)= 0.
Proof. We let µ[·] denote Lebesgue measure on R, and for  > 0 and j =
1,2, . . . , p, let
I ()= {t  0: ∣∣Sj (t,x(t))∣∣> }.
Let u(·) : [0,+∞)→Rm be an admissible strategy for which
+∞∫
0
Fj
(
t,x(t),u(t)
)
dt <+∞
holds for j = 1,2, . . . , p, and further suppose that conditions (i) and (ii) are
satisfied. From our hypotheses there exists δ > 0 such that for all t ∈ I () we
have
Fj
(
t,x(t),u(t)
)
> δ.
Therefore we have
0< δµ
[
I ()
]

∫
I ()
Fj
(
t,x(t),u(t)
)
dt

+∞∫
0
Fj
(
t,x(t),u(t)
)
dt <+∞
from which we immediately obtain that µ[I ()]<+∞ for each  > 0.
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Now suppose that limt→+∞ Sj (t,x(t)) = 0. Then there exists an 0 > 0 and a
sequence of nonnegative numbers {tn}+∞n=1 such that for each n ∈N∣∣Sj (tn,x(tn))∣∣> 0
holds. The continuity of Sj (· , ·) and the fact that µ[I (0)] is finite allows us to
assert the existence of two sequences {t1n}+∞n=1 and {t2n}+∞n=1 satisfying:
(1) t1n < tn < t2n .
(2) |Sj (tin,x(tin))|> 130, i = 1,2.
(3) limn→+∞ t in − tn = 0, i = 1,2.
(4) |Sj (tin,x(tin))− Sj (tn,x(tn))|> 120, i = 1,2.
We divide our considerations into 4 cases:
Case 1. Sj (tn,x(tn)) > 0 for infinitely many indices n and Eq. (35) holds.
Without loss of generality we assume that Sj (tn,x(tn)) > 0 holds for all
n = 1,2, . . . . From (35) it follows that there exists η > 0 and τ > 0 such that
for all t  τ we have
d
dt
Sj
(
t,x(t)
)
< η.
Therefore there exists an integer N > 0 such that t1n > τ for all n N implying
that
Sj (tn,x(tn))− Sj (t1n,x(t1n))
tn − t1n
 η.
On the other hand, our assumptions concerning the sequence {t1n}+∞n=1 we have
η S
j (tn,x(tn))− Sj (t1n,x(t1n))
tn − t1n
>
0
2(tn − t1n)
,
which gives a contradiction since we have that the right-hand side tends to infinity
as n→+∞.
Case 2. Sj (tn,x(tn)) > 0 for infinitely many indices n and Eq. (36) holds.
Once again without loss of generality we assume that Sj (tn,x(tn)) > 0 holds
for all n = 1,2, . . . . From (36) it follows that there exists η > 0 and τ > 0 such
that for all t  τ we have
d
dt
Sj
(
t,x(t)
)
>−η.
Hence, there exists an integer N > 0 such that t1n > τ for all nN implying that
Sj (tn,x(tn))− Sj (t1n,x(t1n))
tn − t1n
−η.
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However, our assumptions permit us to conclude that
−η < S
j (t2n,x(t
2
n))− Sj (tn,x(1n))
t2n − tn
− 0
2(t2n − tn)
,
which again leads to a contradiction.
The remaining two cases:
Case 3. Sj (tn,x(tn)) <−0 for infinitely many indices n and Eq. (35) holds.
and
Case 4. Sj (tn,x(tn)) <−0 for infinitely many indices n and Eq. (36) holds.
are treated in an analogous manner. ✷
5. Examples
In this section we present two simple examples illustrating our work. The first
of these is a simple two-player variational game with quadratic costs. The second
example is a version of the classical infinite-horizon dynamic quadratic regulator
game with linear dynamics
5.1. Example 1
We consider the two-player game in which the cost for player j = 1,2 is given
by
Jj (x1, x2, uj )=
T∫
0
ajx
2
1(t)+ bjx22(t)+ u2j (t) dt,
in which aj , bj > 0 with the dynamics given by
x˙j (t)= uj (t), a.e. 0 t  T .
Here we have for j = 1,2
f 0j (t, x1, x2, uj )= ajx21 + bjx22 + u2j ,
fj (t, x1, x2, uj )= uj .
For this example the Hamiltonians are given as
Hj(x1, x2,pj )= sup
u∈R
{
pju− f 0j (t, x1, x2, u)
}= 1
4
p2j − ajx21 − bjx22 .
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The conditions in Theorem 3.2 become
qj (t, x1, x2)= 12
∂Sj (t, x1, x2)
∂xj
,
for j = 1,2 since fj (t, x1, x2, qj (t, x1, x2)) = qj (t, x1, x2) with the Hamilton–
Jacobi equations being
∂S1
∂t
+ ∂S
1
∂x2
q2 +H1
(
x1, x2,
∂S1
∂x1
)
= 0,
∂S2
∂t
+ ∂S
2
∂x1
q1 +H2
(
x1, x2,
∂S2
∂x2
)
= 0.
We solve this system using the standard method of separation of variables and
assume that that the solutions Sj take the form
Sj (t, x1, x2)=Aj t +Xj(x1)+ Yj (x2),
in whichAj ∈R is a constant andXj(·) and Yj (·) are smooth functions of a single
real variable. Substituting these two forms into the Hamilton–Jacobi equations
gives us
A1 + 12Y
′
1(x2)Y
′
2(x2)+
1
4
(
X′1(x1)
)2 − a1x21 − b1x22 = 0,
A2 + 12X
′
1(x1)X
′
2(x1)+
1
4
(
Y ′2(x2)
)2 − a2x21 − b2x22 = 0.
In each of these equations we can isolate the terms involving the variables x1 and
x2 to get
A1 + 12Y
′
1(x2)Y
′
2(x2)+ b1x22 = a1x21 −
1
4
(
X′1(x1)
)2
,
A2 + 12X
′
1(x1)X
′
2(x1)+ a2x21 = b2x22 −
1
4
(
Y ′2(x2)
)2
.
This permits us to solve for the derivatives of each of the functions Xj(·) and
Yj (·) to get
X′1(x1)=±
√
a1x
2
1 − λ1, Y ′2(x2)=±
√
b2x
2
2 − λ2,
Y ′1(x2)=±
λ1 + b1x22 −A1√
b2x
2
2 − λ2
, X′2(x1)=±
λ2 + a2x2 −A2√
a1x
2
1 − λ1
,
in which λj , for j = 1,2, denotes the separation constants. From this we see that
q1(t, x1, x2)=±12
√
a1x
2
1 − λ1,
q2(t, x1, x2)=±12
√
b2x22 − λ2.
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Thus, for any pair of initial and terminal data, say (x10, x20) and (x1T , x2T ), we
may obtain a solution by solving the two-point boundary value problem
x˙1(t)= q1
(
t, x1(t), x2(t)
)=±1
2
√
a1x21 (t)− λ1,
x˙2(t)= q2
(
t, x1(t), x2(t)
)=±1
2
√
b2x
2
2 (t)− λ2,
x1(0)= x10 and x1(T )= xT 1,
x2(0)= x20 and x2(T )= xT 2.
The solutions to these two differential equations are easily seen to be
x1(t)=
√
a1
λ1
cosh
(
C1 ±√a1t
)
,
x2(t)=
√
b1
λ2
cosh
(
C2 ±
√
b2t
)
,
in which Cj , j = 1,2, are constants of integration. The desired solution is de-
termined choosing Cj and λj to satisfy the desired end conditions. Finally, we
observe that we also have
f 01 (t, x1, x2, u1)−
∂S1
∂t
− ∂S
1
∂x2
q2(t, x1, x2)− ∂S
1
∂x1
f1(t, x1, x2, u1)
= a1x21 + b1x22 + u21 −A1 −
1
2
Y ′1Y ′2 −X′1u1
= a1x21 − λ1 ∓ 2
√
a1x21 − λ1u1 + u21 =
(√
a1x21 − λ1 ∓ u1
)2
and
f 02 (t, x1, x2, u2)−
∂S2
∂t
− ∂S
21
∂x1
q1(t, x1, x2)− ∂S
2
∂x2
f2(t, x1, x2, u2)
= a2x21 + b2x22 + u22 −A2 −
1
2
X′2X′1 − Y ′2u2
= b2x22 − λ2 ∓ 2
√
b2x
2
2 − λ2u2 + u22 =
(√
b1x
2
2 − λ2 ∓ u2
)2
,
from which we immediately see that a solution is obtained by following the pro-
cedure outlined above.
5.2. Example 2
In this example we consider a version of the infinite-horizon quadratic
regulator game. This is clearly the most studied problem of all optimal control
problems. Specifically we assume that each of the p players have their dynamics
described by a linear control system of the form
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x˙j (t)=Ajx(t)+Bjuj (t), t  0,
xj (0)= xj0. (37)
We suppose that xj ∈Rnj , x = (x1, x2, . . . , xp) ∈Rn, n =∑pj=1 nj , Aj is a con-
stant nj × n matrix, uj ∈ Rmj , and Bj is a constant nj × mj matrix. The per-
formance of each player up to time T > 0 is measured by a quadratic functional
taking the form
J Tj (x, uj )=
1
2
T∫
0
{
x(t)′Qjx(t)+ uj (t)′Rjuj (t)
}
dt. (38)
Here we assume that for each j = 1,2, . . . , p the matrices Qj are positive semi-
definite of size n × n and that the matrices Rj are positive definite with size
mj ×mj .
The associated Hamiltonians Hj :Rn ×Rnj →R take the form
Hj(x,pj )= sup
uj∈Rmj
{
〈pj ,Ajx+Bjuj 〉 − 12
[
x′Qjx+ u′jRjuj
]}
= 1
2
p′j
(
BjR
−1
j B
′
j
)
pj +p′jAjx−
1
2
xQjx.
To proceed further, the relationship
f 0j (t,x, qj (t,x))
∂uj
=
(
∂fj (t,x, qj (t,x))
∂uj
)′
∂Sj (t,x)
∂xj
becomes
Rjqj (t,x)= B ′j
∂Sj (t,x)
∂xj
or, equivalently,
qj (t,x)=R−1j B ′j
∂Sj (t,x)
∂xj
.
With this information the Hamilton–Jacobi system becomes
∂Sj
∂t
+
∑
i =j
(
∂Sj
∂xi
)′[
Aix+BiR−1i B ′i
∂Si
∂xi
]
=−Hj
(
x,
∂Sj
∂xj
)
or, more explicitly,
∂Sj
∂t
+
p∑
i=1
(
∂Sj
∂xi
)′[
Aix+BiR−1i B ′i
∂Si
∂xi
]
= 1
2
x′Qjx.
From the above analysis it is easy to see that once the system of Hamilton–Jacobi
equations has been solved it is an easy matter to obtain the Nash equilibrium
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strategies. Additionally, we observe that since the dynamic game is autonomous
it is reasonable to obtain a solution to this system of partial differential equation
which is time independent. Finally, we remark that since the dynamics of each
player are described by a linear ordinary differential control system there is a
strong motivation to seek linear feedbacks controls. That is, we want
∂Sj
∂xj
(x)=−Kjjx, j = 1,2, . . . , p,
in which Kjj is an nj × n constant matrix. This suggests that we seek ni × n
matrices Kji , i, j = 1,2, . . . , p, such that
∂Sj
∂xi
(x)=−Kjix.
With this specification it is easy to see that the above system of Hamilton–Jacobi
equations reduces to solving the following system of coupled matrix Riccati
equations:
−
p∑
i=1
(K ′jiAi +A′iKji)+
p∑
i=1
(
K ′jiBiR
−1
i B
′
iKii +K ′iiBiR−1i B ′iKji
)
=K ′jjBjR−1j B ′jKjj +Qj,
for j = 1,2, . . . , p. This is a system of p equations in the p2 unknowns Kji and,
consequently, the system is underdetermined. This suggests that for the dynamic
game case additional restrictions need to be imposed to insure solvability. One
such assumption would be to assume that the conditions Kji = K ′ij for i, j =
1,2, . . . , p hold. This further insures that the feedback gain matrices Kjj would
be symmetric, a standard assumption for quadratic-regulator games.
6. Conclusions
In this paper we have successfully extended the method of equivalent
variational problems, initiated in the work of Carathéodory [4], to a class of
dynamic games. In addition we have shown that, at least in a simple example,
this approach can be used to obtain a feedback Nash equilibrium. The system of
Hamilton–Jacobi equations that are obtained are generally nonlinear and coupled.
The solution of such a system is probably very difficult and perhaps much
remains to be investigated. Indeed, even in the single player case the solution
to these equations are often elusive. The introduction of the notion of viscosity
solutions for nonlinear first-order partial differential equation in the 1980’s has
greatly improved this situation. On the other hand, it is apparently an open
question in the realm of dynamic games as to whether analogous notions exist.
A thorough understanding of these ideas for systems of nonlinear first-order
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partial differential equations would provide some very useful information for
obtaining a theory of feedback Nash equilibria for this and perhaps other classes
of dynamic games. We further remark that the results given above could easily
be generalized to variational games in which the integrands functions involved
are also coupled through the control variables. Our choice for the special case
considered here is chosen for clarity mainly due to the relative simplicity of the
Hamiltonians that are obtained.
References
[1] T. Bas¸ar, G. Olsder, Dynamic Noncooperative Game Theory, 2nd ed., in: Classics in Applied
Mathematics, Vol. 23, SIAM Publications, Philadelphia, PA, 1998.
[2] L.D. Berkovitz, A theory of differential games, in: T. Bas¸ar, A. Haurie (Eds.), Advances in
Dynamic Games and Applications, Birkhäuser, Boston, MA, 1994, pp. 3–22.
[3] T.F. Bridgeland, On the existence of optimal feedback controls, SIAM J. Control 1 (1963) 261–
274.
[4] C. Carathéodory, Calculus of Variations Partial Differential Equations, Chelsea, New York, 1982.
[5] D.A. Carlson, A. Haurie, A. Leizarowitz, Infinite Horizon Optimal Control: Deterministic and
Stochastic Systems, 2nd ed., Springer-Verlag, New York, 1991.
[6] D.A. Carlson, A. Haurie, A turnpike theory for infinite horizon open-loop differential games with
decoupled controls, in: G.J. Olsder (Ed.), New Trends in Dynamic Games and Applications, in:
Annals of the International Society of Dynamic Games, Birkhäuser, Boston, MA, 1995, pp. 353–
376.
[7] D.A. Carlson, A. Haurie, A turnpike theory for infinite horizon open-loop competitive processes,
SIAM J. Control Optim. 34 (1996) 1405–1419.
[8] D.A. Carlson, Carathéodory–Hamilton–Jacobi theory for nonsmooth problems of Lagrange and
optimal control, J. Math. Anal. Appl. 162 (1985) 259–273.
[9] D.A. Carlson, A Carathéodory–Hamilton–Jacobi theory for infinite horizon optimal control
problems, J. Optim. Theory Appl. 48 (1986) 265–287.
[10] L. Cesari, Optimization—Theory and Applications: Problems with Ordinary Differential
Equations, in: Applications of Applied Mathematics, Vol. 17, Springer-Verlag, New York, 1983.
[11] L.O. Courtat, Markov equilibria of stochastic games with complementarities, Games Econom.
Behav. 17 (1996) 177–199.
[12] A. Friedman, Differential Games, in: Pure and Applied Mathematics, Vol. XXV, John Wiley and
Sons, New York, 1971.
[13] A.S. Nowak, Correlated equilibria in nonzero-sum differential games, J. Math. Anal. Appl. 174
(1993) 539–549.
[14] A.S. Nowak, K. Szajowski, Nonzero-sum stochastic games, in: M. Bardi, T.E.S. Raghavan,
Parthasarathy (Eds.), Stochastic and Differential Games, Theory and Numerical Methods,
Birkhäuser, Boston, MA, 1999, pp. 297–342.
[15] D.R. Snow, Carathéodory–Hamilton–Jacobi theory in optimal control, J. Math. Anal. Appl. 16
(1967) 99–118.
[16] A.W. Starr, Y.C. Ho, Nonzero-sum differential games, J. Optim. Theory Appl. 3 (1969) 184–206.
[17] H. Tan, W.J. Rugh, Nonlinear overtaking optimal control: Sufficiency, stability, and approxima-
tion, IEEE Trans. Automat. Control 43 (1998) 1703–1718.
[18] K. Uchida, On the existence of Nash equilibrium point in n-person nonzero-sum stochastic
differential games, SIAM J. Control Optim. 16 (1978) 142–149.
[19] K. Uchida, A note on the existence of Nash equilibrium point in stochastic differential games,
SIAM J. Control Optim. 17 (1979) 1–4.
